Frequestly Asked Questions (and answers) about Stoic philosophy
They had very different ideas on what it meant to be virtuous, and what “Nature” referred to. For the Cynics, it meant rejecting society entirely and living as homeless people, and trying to get others to do the same. For the Stoics, it meant working as part of society, for the good of mankind. For the Stoics, although virtue was the only good, some externals were to be preferred over others, and virtue was tied up in dealing with these preferences, which in turn meant working within society.
Other aspects that differed were that the Stoics (at least the early Stoics) had a strong interest in physics (which for the Stoics included theology), natural science, logic, etc. while the Cynics rejected the study of any of these.
Arnold’s Roman Stoicism (1911) provides some good discussion of how the conceptions of virtue differed between the two schools, and how the came about historically.
From section 319:
Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between ethical principles of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal reason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind. The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into touch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this arises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this doctrine as an afterthought suggested by practical difficulties, and alien from the original teaching of Zeno, This seems to be a misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said ‘some things are good, some are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice, fortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue ; evil are folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth’ But there is a difference between a principle and its application; and this very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of this difference.
Arnold’s account of the philosophers with which Zeno studied, and who influenced what in Stoic philosophy, is also enlightening. After describing Crates of Thebes, the Cynic philosopher under which Zeno first studied, and Zeno’s writing of his Republic (his vision of a utopian society) while still a student of Crates, Arnold describes Zeno’s education thereafter. Starting in section 76 of Roman Stoicism:
Zeno, after writing his Republic, took up a position more independent of the Cynics. He could not, perhaps, avoid noticing that the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the narrowmindedness of the philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack of clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of dialectics and physics was of more importance than his Cynic teachers would allow; and he seems to have conceived the idea of uniting the Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned first to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school. Crates, we are told, tried to drag him back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno retorted that argument would be more to the point. From this time he no longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also for argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations of his state must be surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion, but on the rock of knowledge. That a wise man should hesitate, change his views, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach. If indeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that know- ledge is within the reach of man?
Arnold then goes on to discuss his studies of and with other philosophers, both directly with contemporaries and indirectly of predecessors, for example Heraclitus, Stilpo, and Polemo. Section 78 starts…
In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine, entered a new world. He left behind the rough manners, the stinging retorts, and the narrow culture the Cynics and Eristics to sit with other intelligent students at the feet of a man of cultured manners and wide reading, who to a love for Homer and Sophocles had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge of the works of Plato and Aristotle, was himself a great writer and yet consistently taught that not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to be attained. That Zeno profited much from his studies under Polemo we may conjecture from Polemo’s good-natured complaint, ‘I see well what you are after: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you dress in Phoenician clothes’ From this time it became a conventional complaint that Stoic doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics…